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Weiss: Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for E

PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IN DOMESTIC
RELATIONS LAW: A PROPOSAL FOR EXCLUDING
EDUCATIONAL DEGREES AND PROFESSIONAL
LICENSES FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE
INTRODUCTION

An issue, which has created considerable judicial controversy, is
whether to treat an advanced educational degree or a professional
license1 earned by one spouse during a marriage as marital property
subject to distribution upon divorce. This issue arises in the common
situation where a wife gives up the opportunity to further her education and to enjoy a regular income3 in order to work and contribute
her income to her husband's education, thus enabling him to earn his
professional degree. Although a majority of the courts have found
1. An advanced educational degree and a professional license will hereinafter be referred
to as "degree."
2. There are two types of statutes which give the courts authority to divide the marital
assets between the spouses upon divorce. Eight states-Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington-have a community property system. Property
is owned in common by the husband and wife, each having an undivided one-half interest by
reason of his or her marital status. Thus, one-half of the earnings of each spouse is considered
to be owned by the other spouse. See, e.g., LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 155, 159 (West Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West Supp. 1982).

Thirty-nine states and

Washington, D.C. have an equitable distribution system. The underlying premise of this legislation is that contemporary marriage should be regarded, for economic and property purposes,
as a partnership of co-equals. See H. FOSTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 41 (Supp. 1981). All

marital property acquired during the marriage should, upon dissolution of the marriage, be
equitably distributed between the spouses in accordance with the state's criteria. Other related
economic incidents of the marital partnership, like alimony, should be disposed of on the basis
of actual need and ability to pay. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 19821983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
The remaining five states-Georgia, Mississippi, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and West
Virginia-are common law jurisdictions. Under this system, separate property, determined by
title, remains such and the court has little authority to alter these property rights. Only jointly
owned property is subject to distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23
(Harrison Supp. 1982). See H. FOSTER, supra note 2, at app. A (Supp. 1981).
3. The opportunity to enjoy a regular income refers to the economic support provided by
the other spouse, derived from his full time employment.
4. In keeping with the factual situation common to most cases, see, e.g., cases cited infra
note 5, this note will treat the situation where the wife works to further her husband's career
and educational goals. The same analysis should apply, however, in the situation where the
spouses' roles are reversed.
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that a professional degree is not a marital asset, 5 several courts have
held that the degree, or its potential to increase its holders' earning
capacity, is a form of property in which the spouse who contributed
to its attainment is entitled to share.' The courts favoring the latter
approach have either awarded the contributing spouse a share in the
value of the education,7 or have ordered that she be reimbursed for
her monetary investment in the degree. 8 Unlike most courts,9 commentators have favored the approach which treats the degree as a
marital asset. 10 These commentators have proposed compensation
schemes, which some courts have begun to adopt, such as awarding
the wife a part of the degree's determined monetary value,1" or a
5. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981); Aufmuth v.
Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo.
429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); McManama v. McManama, 73 Ind. 836, 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980);
Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488,
453 A.2d 527 (1982); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); Frausto
v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296
N.W,2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980); see also infra notes 108-36 and accompanying text.
6. Horstmann v. Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578
S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), afid, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23,
1982); Reen v. Reen, No. 75641, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. Prob. & Fain. Ct. Dec.
23, 1981); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d
527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Daniels
v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App. 1961); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1979).
7. See Horstmann v. Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Reen v. Reen, No.
75641, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. Prob. & Faro. Ct. Dec. 23, 1981); O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio
Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App. 1961).
8. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), aft'd, 9 FArM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2131 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97
(1978); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. Sup. Ct.
1979). The cases cited supra note 7, which hold that the degree is an asset of the marriage,
have not distinguished between a professional degree and future earning capacity. The courts
which have held either the degree or the earning potential to be property, see cases cited supra
note 6, have not explained why one is valued as a marital asset and the other is not. See
Comment, ProfessionalEducation as a Divisible Asset in MarriageDissolutions, 64 IOWA L.
REv. 705, 710 n.51 (1979). For the purposes of this note, it is assumed that courts valuing the
degree itself and those awarding a portion of future earnings made possible by the degree are
basing their decisions on the same property distribution concepts. At least one commentator
has taken this approach. Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Marital
Asset Upon Divorce?, 15 AKRON L. REV. 543 (1982). Moore grouped both types of holdings
into a single category. Id. at 544. See also Comment, The Interest of the Community in a
Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 590 (1974).
9. See supra note 5.
10. See Infra notes 11, 12.
11. E.g., Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection
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restitutional solution which reimburses the wife for her out of pocket
expenses.1 2

This note suggests that the best and most practical approach is
to treat an educational degree as personal to its bearer. It should
not be considered marital property, and therefore, should not be subject to distribution upon divorce. Part I of this note presents rationales favoring the treatment of a professional degree as a marital
asset. Part II examines the reasoning of those courts which refuse to
consider an educational degree as property. This note then analyzes
these competing rationales and concludes that the professional degree should not be treated as marital property subject to distribution
under any circumstances.
I.

A.

PROFESSIONAL DEGREES AS MARITAL PROPERTY

Awards based on the Monetary Value of the Degree

Several courts have treated the degree as marital property.13 In
Reen v. Reen, 4 a Massachusetts trial court, holding that the husband's dental school degree was itself an asset of the marriage and
therefore subject to distribution upon divorce, placed a value of
$800,000 on the degree and awarded the wife $120,000 as her share
For The Marital Investor In Human Capital,28 KANSAS L. REV. 379 (1980); Recent Development, Divorce-The Effect of a Spouse's Professional Degree on a Division of Marital
Property and Award of Alimony, Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979), 15 TULSA
L.J. 378 (1979). See also infra text accompanying notes 31-53.
12. Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the
Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 948 n.4; Moore, supra note 8, at 555;
Note, Graduate Degree Rejected as Marital Property Subject to Division Upon Divorce: In
Re Marriage of Graham, 11 CONN. L. REV. 62, 73 (1978). See also infra text accompanying
notes 83-98.
13. See cases cited supra notes 7, 8; see also In re Neuhaus, 9 FAm. L. REP. (BNA)
2168 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 1982), where the court ruled that a husband's license to practice dentistry, obtained during the marriage, is divisible community property. The order required the husband to pay his former spouse one-fourth of his net income each year for five
years. The marriage lasted five years and there were no children. Judge William L. Brown,
Jr., offered this explanation for his decision: "[C]ontributions of the wife toward the acquisition of the education of the husband were substantial" and "'[i]t did not seem fair to me that
the husband should leave this marriage with an extremely valuable asset, namely, his dental
education. . . free and clear from any interests of the wife. I felt it was only fair that the wife
be accorded some share of that future economic benefit.'" Id.; see also Daniels v. Daniels, 20
Ohio Op. 2d 458, 459, 185 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio App. 1961) ("the right to practice
medicine, being in the nature of a franchise, constitutes property"). While the court concluded
that the education itself was an asset for determining an award of alimony, it did not consider
this as "property" subject to equitable distribution. See id.
14. No. 75641, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. Prob. & Fain. Ct. Dec. 23, 1981).
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in its distribution.15 During the ten year marriage, while Dr. Reen
was pursuing his dental training, Mrs. Reen worked to support the
couple."6 When the couple divorced, the only substantial marital asset was Dr. Reen's professional degree. The court, in reaching its
decision, 17 reasoned that because the wife had "contributed to the
acquisition, preservation and appreciation in value of the [husband's]
estate by being the sole contributor of the majority of income to
their family unit from the date of their marriage,"18 she had enabled
him to acquire his degree and was therefore entitled to part of its
value.19
In O'Brien v. O'Brien20 and Kutanovski v. Kutanovski,2 1 two
New York lower courts held that a wife is entitled to a share of the
value of her husband's medical degree. In O'Brien, the court
awarded a doctor's wife 40% of her husband's projected earnings
over his productive life expectancy. 22 The facts revealed that the
wife's entire earnings supported the marriage for nine years while
her husband completed college and studied medicine. The court
found that the wife's "financial input was substantial; she contributed approximately 76% of the couple's total income and assumed
the dominant role of breadwinner so that plaintiff [husband] could
achieve his ambition to obtain a medical license." 2 The court, concluding that the wife deserved a portion of the value of her husband's degree since he would not have acquired his professional status without her financial assistance, reasoned that marriage should
be considered an economic partnership. It stated that:
There can be no valid distinction made under the Equitable Distribution Law between a degree or professional license acquired during the marriage as compared to a business or professional practice
conducted during the course of the marriage where both were enhanced by the financial contributions and efforts of the other
spouse. 24
15. Reen v. Reen, No. 75641, slip op. at 35, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. Prob.
& Fam. Ct. Dec. 23, 1981) (The chart which provides this information can only be found in
the slip opinion.).
16.

Id.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1982, at 12, col. 5.
114 Misc. 2d at 241-42, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.

23. Id. at 236, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
24. Id. at 240, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B) (McKinney

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss4/8

4

Weiss: Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for E

19831

DEGREES AND THE MARITAL ESTATE

Since the O'Brien court placed great emphasis on the wife's significant financial contribution to the attainment of her husband's degree, specifically distinguishing cases in which the wife had made
little or no financial contributions, 5 its holding that the degree is
property should be limited to the facts of that case.
In Kutanovski, the court calculated the wife's contribution to
her husband's medical degree to be $62,000 and held that the husband must pay her $6,200 a year for ten years.2 6 Mrs. Kutanovski
met her husband in Yugoslavia after he had obtained his medical
degree. When he came to the United States, she tutored him in English and tested him on material to be found on the American licensing exam, thus enabling him to pass the examination. In addition,
the wife worked to support the couple.28 The Kutanovski court extended the O'Brien theory under a "fruits of the license" concept,
finding that since Mrs. Kutanovski contributed to her husband's professional career, "the fruits of that contribution" are assets subject
to equitable distribution.2
In Kutanovski, as in O'Brien, the court found that the degree
was property because of the unique circumstances of the case. Thus
under the court's reasoning, an educational degree attained during a
marriage would not consistently be held to be property subject to
distribution. The wife would have a proprietary interest only if she
had made significant monetary contributions to the acquisition of the
degree.
The Iowa Supreme Court has also addressed this issue. Horstmann v. Horstmann30 held that a law degree and license to practice
law do not constitute assets of the marriage in and of themselves.31
Rather, it is the "potential for increase in future earning capacity
made possible by the law degree

. . .

conferred upon the husband

with the aid of his wife's efforts which constitutes the asset for distribution . .

"32

In Horstmann, once the parties were married, the

Supp. 1982-1983). But see infra text accompanying notes 127-36.
25.
26.

114 Misc. 2d at 236, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1982, at 12, col. 5. This was in addition to $250 a week mainte-

nance and support for their son. Id.
27. Id. Prior to receiving his wife's help, the husband had failed the examination. Id.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
Id. at 891.
Id.
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wife "did not complete her formal education." 33 Instead, while the
husband attended law school, the wife worked and contributed her
salary to the family expenses.34
Strict application of the court's reasoning that future earnings,
not the degree itself, are marital property, could produce an anomalous result. If a wife supported her husband through professional
school but the husband did not practice in the profession, the wife
could be left uncompensated for her contributions to her husband's
educational expenses.35
In addition, Horstmann's result is inconsistent with its reasoning. The court refused to hold the degree to be property; instead, it
declared that the asset is the degree holder's future earning capacity.
This argument, however, is circular: The potential for increased
earnings does not exist without the degree, yet the degree is not valuable property. Additionally, the trial court had ordered the husband
to pay the wife $18,000.36 When the supreme court affirmed, it
stated it was correct to use the cost of education to establish the
value of the degree. 37 Thus, in effect, the court was, treating the degree itself as an item of property, notwithstanding its explicit refusal
to do so.
In finding that a professional degree acquired during the marriage is marital property subject to equitable distribution, courts are
following what they perceive to be the policy behind the various
schemes of property distribution: Marriage is an economic partnership and the concept of property should be broad enough to include
all of the economic resources acquired during the marriage. 38
Many commentators agree that a degree should be considered
marital property subject to distribution." The reason most frequently offered in support of this position is economic fairness.40 In
33. Id.at 886.
34. Id.
35. See also Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 434, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. Ct. App.
1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting) (while the degree was not a divisible property item, increased
earning power resulting from the degree was a divisible property item). The majority in Graham held that an educational degree could not be a divisible marital asset because it does not
have any of the elements of property in the traditional sense of that term. Id. at 432, 574 P.2d
at 77.
36. 263 N.W.2d at 888.
37. Id. at 891.
38. See cases cited supra note 7.
39. See sources cited supra note 11.
40. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 713; Recent Development, supra note 11, at.
388-89. In conjunction with this argument, it is often urged that there is no need for the courts
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the typical situation, divorce takes place shortly after the husband
obtains his degree and thus, the couple has little or no tangible marital property. Treating the degree as a divisible asset is encouraged
since there is no other way to achieve economic equality between the
spouses. 41 This goal of preventing unjust enrichment by way of
quasi-contract principles has compelled one writer to reject limiting
the value of the professional degree to a cash award representing
dollars invested in the education.42 He reasons that:
Although the usual measure of the "enrichment" conferred in a
quasi-contract action is the cost of the conferring party's investment, the equitable principles applied to prevent unjust enrichment
also allow for a proportionate recovery of the increased value conferred on the benefited party when that value can be measured
43

A second reason offered in support of this position is that the
wife who gives up her education and regular economic support in
to adopt a traditional and restrictive view of "property" when assessing the marital assets. In
Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978), the dissent criticized
the majority for following traditional narrow concepts of property and concluded that restrictions on remedies would result in an injustice. Id. at 434, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). "As a matter of economic reality the most valuable asset acquired by either party during
this six year marriage was the husband's increased earning capacity." Id. (Carrigan, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the degree itself was not the asset, but that the husband's
earning power was an asset achieved by the couple and should therefore be divided. Id. (Carrigan, J., dissenting). See Note, supra note 12, at 70-71; Recent Development, supra note 11, at
382 n.26. In McManama v. McManama, 73 Ind. 836, 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980), Justice Hunter
dissented from the majority's holding that a law degree did not constitute a vested present
interest and was therefore not property that could be divisible upon dissolution of the marriage. Id. at 373. Justice Hunter criticized the majority for narrowly construing the concept of
property. Id. at 373-74. In doing so, Justice Hunter quoted Justice Marshall's dissent in Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974): "We have said that property interests requiring constitutional protection 'extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.'" Id.
at 207-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also Moore, supra note 8, at 546.
But see Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982) where the court recognized
its frequent holdings giving the word "property" an expansive interpretation, yet went on to
distinguish educational degrees from other assets and interests which have been subjected to
equitable distribution. In making this distinction, the Mahoney court noted that in Kikkert v.
Kikkert, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981), it had previously held that a vested but unmatured
private pension was a distributable marital asset. Id. at 5, 438 A.2d at 318. The Mahoney
court reasoned, however, that an educational degree represented merely the possibility of enhanced future earnings. 91 N.J. at 496, 453 A.2d at 532. In contrast, the court continued,
pensions are representative of benefits already earned and they guarantee the receipient a specified amount of income at a certain date. Id. at 496, 453 A.2d at 531.
41. Moore, supra note 8, at 553.
42. Krauskopf, supra note 11, at 409.
43. Id.
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order to finance her husband's professional education 44 usually does
so with the expectation that she will benefit from the increased income that her husband will earn from the practice of his profession.45 It is argued that it would be unfair to permit a divorce to
deprive the wife of the value of her "investments," since it was the
intention of the parties to accumulate and to invest the assets derived
from the husband's professional practice for the mutual benefit of
the couple.46 The investing spouse should therefore recover her share
of the value of her spouse's increased earning potential over and
above her investment cost.47 This argument was recognized in Prosser v. Prosser,48 where the court awarded the wife $6,500, reasoning
that her investment in the husband's economic future was for the
benefit of both of them and that she "had a right to expect that in
the years to come she would share in the benefits derived from the
training and '49
ability of the [husband], which she literally helped to
bring about.
Another reason suggested for considering the degree as a marital asset is the husband's increased incentive for divorcing his wife
soon after receiving his degree.50 A husband who waits to divorce
may accumulate substantial assets which will then be subject to distribution by the court. Thus, where the wife cannot be compensated
through her husband's degree, the husband is encouraged to seek divorce early in his professional career. 51
Those courts and commentators who advocate the treatment of
44.
45.
46.
47.

Moore, supra note 8, at 553-54.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Krauskopf, supra note 11, at 393. Formulating an award based on the value of the

degree or future earning capacity is speculative and may contribute significantly to the courts'

reluctance to find a professional degree to be marital property. However, Professor Moore
notes:
[E]valuating a professional degree does not appear to involve any more speculation
or uncertainty than does the assessment of damages for pain, mental distress, or loss
of consortium, and for which a majority of courts allow awards. In fact, the courts

commonly allow an evaluation of a professional education for the purpose of calculating damages in wrongful death and personal injury cases.
Moore, supra note 8, at 547. See also Note, supra note 12, at 71 supra text accompanying

notes 159-64.
48. 156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 173 (1953).
49. Id. at 632, 57 N.W.2d at 175.
50. See Moore, supra note 8, at 554; Recent Development, Domestic Relations-Educational Degree Does Not Constitute Marital Property Subject to Division Between Spouses
Upon Divorce, Graham v. Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978), 13 TULSA L. REv. 646, 651

(1978).
51.

See Recent Development, supra note 50, at 651.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss4/8

8

Weiss: Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for E
19831

DEGREES AND THE MARITAL ESTATE

an educational degree as an item of property follow a broad definition of property. They believe that property is not limited to ownership of chattels or real estate, but rather, that it can take the form of
rights which are capable of valuation, division, and distribution.52 In
addition, some take the position that contributions towards an educational degree are analogous to investing in a business that has potential for financial success. 53 As a result, the wife's share of the degree
is not limited to the amount of her expenditures; rather, she is entitled to her share of the "future profits," i.e., the potential increased
earnings made possible by the degree.
This approach has been used only in a minority of jurisdictions.54 Most courts, correctly, do not recognize a proprietary interest in intangible items such as an educational degree for purposes of
division upon marital dissolution.55 Classifying a degree as a divisible
asset obligates the court to speculate as to the worth of the degree.
This will inevitably lead to inequities for both spouses. 56 Additionally, analogizing marital educational financing to investing in a commercial enterprise ignores the personal basis behind the institution of
marriage by reducing the marital relationship to an arm's length
commercial transaction.5
B. Restitutional Awards
As an alternative approach, several courts have treated the professional degree as a marital asset but have awarded the wife, as
restitution, the approximate dollar value of her investment. 8 Thus,
in contrast to courts which have valued the wife's interest in the degree in some proportion to future earnings enhanced by it, these
courts have limited the wife's recovery to repayment of the approximate monetary amount she contributed to its acquisition. For example, in Inman v. Inman,5 9 the parties were married before the husband began dental school. The wife supported her husband through
52.

See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1982);

Moore, supra note 8, at 553-54.
53. See, e.g., Prosser v. Presser, 156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 173 (1953); Krauskopf,
supra note 11.

54.
55.
56.
57.

See cases cited supra note 7.
See cases cited supra note 5.
See infra text accompanying notes 113-18.
See infra text accompanying notes 127-32.

58. See cases cited supra note 8.
59. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), affid, 9 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 23, 1982).
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school and continued to work throughout the next seventeen years of
their marriage. At the time of their divorce, the couple was on the
brink of bankruptcy.6 0 Although the Inmans were married for many
years after the husband became a dentist, the Inman court considered their situation to be analogous to one where the divorce occurs
shortly after the degree is attained and there are few or no other
possible marital assets from which to make a property distribution.6 1
The court held that a professional degree is property when equity so
requires for the supporting spouse6 2
Based upon this standard, the degree would be an appropriate
asset for distribution where the marriage dissolves just subsequent to
the completion of the education and there are no other assets to distribute, or where there is no possible award of maintenance. In such
circumstances, "treating a professional license as marital property is
the only way in which a court can achieve an equitable result." 3
The court decided that the best measure of a spouse's interest in the
degree is the amount of her monetary contribution to it.6" The court
thus opted for a restitutional approach, holding that "the amount
spent for direct support and school expenses during the period of
education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation,
should be apportioned to the spouse who provided support when...
there is little or no marital property ...
.
The Inman court was most concerned with the lack of traditional marital assets. In fact, the court stated that the degree would
not have been treated as an asset if there had been traditional marital property to divide.66 Thus, the Inman court viewed itself as a
court of equity, compelled to disregard traditional legal reasoning in
favor of achieving an equitable result.
Another restitutional approach was taken by the Supreme
60. Id. at 267.
61. Id. at 269-70.
62. Id. at 268. The court reasoned that equity compels some form of renumeration for a
spouse whose contributions to the marriage have significantly exceeded those of the mate. The
court decided that equity was best served by placing a dollar value on the wife's contributions
to her husband's degree. Id. at 270.
63. Id. at 268.
64. Id. at 269.
65. Id. at 269-70. See also DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981),
where the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted this rationale and followed a similar formula for
measuring recovery: The working spouse's financial contributions to joint living expenses and
educational costs of the student spouse, less one-half the living expenses. Id. at 759.
66. 578 S.W.2d at 268.
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Court of Oklahoma in Hubbard v. Hubbard.67 In that case, the wife
worked to support the couple while the husband completed his undergraduate and medical schooling. Although the court found that
the husband's professional degree and license were not marital property,68 it formulated a remedy premised upon theories of unjust enrichment and quasi-contract. 69 Therefore, although the husband's
degree was held to be his own property, the court nonetheless concluded that the wife had "an equitable claim to repayment for the
investment she made in [the husband's] education and training."70
The Hubbardcourt believed that a wife in these circumstances
had a remedy based on the doctrine of quasi-contract. 71 Thus, the
court's equitable solution, used to prevent the husband's unjust enrichment, is limited to the facts of the case. This is underscored by
the fact that the court stated it would have fashioned an alternate
remedy, such as distribution of traditional assets, if doing so would
72
have compensated the wife sufficiently.
In a recent New Jersey case, Mahoney v. Mahoney,7 3 the parties were married for seven years during which time, with the exception of a sixteen month period during which the husband obtained an
MBA degree, both contributed to the household expenses. The wife's
contributions totaled approximately $24,000 while the husband was
attending school.7 4 The court, while not treating the educational degree as property,7 5 recognized a need to award the wife an amount
based on the costs to her while her husband pursued his degree. 6
The court reasoned that the wife had made financial contributions
67. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
68. See id. at 750.
69. Id. at 752.
70.

Id. at 750. The court devised boundaries for calculating reimbursement:

[W]e limit the factors determining [the cash award in lieu of property settlement]
to fair compensation for her past investment, rather than a "vested interest" in [the
husband's] future earnings.
...[W]e have done nothing in this action but allow Ms. Hubbard a return on
her investment to prevent Dr. Hubbard's unjust enrichment.
Id. at 752. See also Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978), where the

court affirmed the trial court's award of alimony in lieu of a property settlement, despite the
fact that the wife's current earnings exceeded those of her husband.

71.

603 P.2d at 751.

72.
73.

Id. at 752..
91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).

74. Id. at 493, 453 A.2d at 529.
75.

Id. at 492, 453 A.2d at 529.

76. Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 534.
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towards her husband's education with the expectation that both
would enjoy future advantages flowing from the degree. Moreover,
the wife made other personal sacrifices, such as reducing her standard of living while her husband was not employed."
The Mahoney court termed this concept "reimbursement alimony" and stated it should "cover all financial contributions towards
the former spouse's education, including household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions used
by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license. 78
The court opined that this was consistent with the basic purpose of
alimony which relates to the quality of economic life to which one
spouse is entitled and which becomes the obligation of the other.",
The court stressed, however, that not every contributing spouse is
entitled to reimbursement. "Only monetary contributions made with
the mutual and shared expectation that both parties to the marriage
will derive increased income and material benefits should be a basis
for such an award." 80
Although the Mahoney court rejected the notion of a degree as
property and termed its remedy "alimony," the court actually recognized a proprietary interest in the degree. The court found that a
wife who expends money towards the acquisition of a degree, anticipating future monetary benefits, has an equitable claim for repayment of her investment.8 1 This, in essence, treats the degree as an
asset, merely limiting the award to the amounts actually contributed.
Numerous commentators support the restitution approach. 2
These writers feel that it is the most equitable and practical solution
to ensure a wife's reimbursement for the money expended on her
husband's behalf,8 3 and have advanced at least five arguments in
favor of it.
The first argument is that principles of equity demand restitution.84 "The basic requirements are that one [spouse] has received a
77. Id.
78. Id. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534 (emphasis in original).
79. See Infra note 117.
80. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 502-03, 453 A.2d at 535. See also Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510,
453 A.2d 539 (1982).
81. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 502-03, 453 A.2d at 535.
82. See sources cited supra note 12.
83. Erickson, supra note 12, at 949; Moore, supra note 8, at 545; Note, supra note 12,
at 73.
84. Note, Family Law: Ought a ProfessionalDegree be Divisible as Property Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 519 (1981).
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benefit at the expense of another, and that as between them it would
be unjust for the recipient to retain the benefit without compensation
to the other person. 85 A benefit can take the form of any advantage,
and in the absence of its being conferred gratuitiously, failure to restitute would be unfair.88 Since there are often no other assets at the
time of divorce from which the wife could be reimbursed, a refusal
to treat the husband's professional degree as marital property for the
purposes of restitution would result in the unjust enrichment of the
husband.87
Second, the restitutional approach has been considered a means
of avoiding the problem of speculation88 as to the value of the degree.8 9 A husband would be required to reimburse his wife only for
the financial aid she provided toward the acquisition of the degree.
Thus, one need only calculate the amount spent on educational expenses (tuition, books, etc.) and one half the couple's living expenses
during the schooling years, and require the husband to make restitution to the wife for those expenditures.9"
Third, the restitutional approach eliminates the possibility of a
division of the husband's post-divorce earnings, a problem that may
occur if the degree is treated as a distributable marital asset.91 One
commentator notes that if the wife had received a duly executed
promissory note in exchange for lending her husband tuition costs,
she would be able to collect on the note even after the marriage dissolved.9 2 "The fact that the note would have to be paid off out of the
husband's post-divorce earnings would not render it uncollectable.
Surely a divorcing wife's right to reimbursement. . . should not rest
on the technicality of whether she had . . . procured from her hus-

'9 3
band a formally executed promisory note."
Fourth, if a professional degree is held to be marital property

85.

Krauskopf, supra note 11, at 391 (emphasis in original).

86. Id.
87. Note, supra note 84, at 519.
88. The courts will rarely achieve equitable results for both parties because valuation of
the degree will inevitably be inaccurate since the earning capacity of the degree-holder will
vary according to individual circumstances and factors. See infra text accompanying notes
112-18.
89. See supra note 47. However, the valuation may prove grossly inequitable if the
spouse with the special degree does not pursue a professional career. See infra text accompanying notes 113-18.
90. Moore, supra note 8, at 548.
91. Id. at 552.
92. Id. at 553.

93. Id.
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subject to distribution, the husband may be compelled to practice his
profession; he may therefore be denied the freedom of choice to
abandon that career.94 The restitutionary response, however, may
avoid this result: The wife would receive only the amounts expended
by her during the time her husband attained his degree.
Thus," [w] hatever use the husband decides to make of his professional training, it should not be unduly burdensome to require him to
reimburse his wife for her contributions to its acquisition." 5
Fifth, a wife's contribution to the acquisition of her husband's
degree has been analogized to the situation where a man gives a ring
to his fiancee in contemplation of marriage.96 If the engagement is
broken, the man is entitled to the return of his present, if it was
given contingent upon marriage. The rationale is that the marriage,
which was the condition of the gift, did not occur.9 7 In the same way,
a wife's contributions to her husband's professional training may be
considered contingent upon the marriage lasting long enough for the
wife to benefit financially from her husband's professional status:
"Since an early divorce has prevented this condition from being satisfied, the wife should be allowed restitution for the value of her
contributions." 9 8
Thus, both the courts and commentators advocating the restitutional approach feel that simple justice demands that a wife be reasonably compensated for her contributions to the acquisition of her
husband's degree. They conclude that the fairest solution is to reimburse the wife for her financial expenditures. 9 Some opinions limit
restitution to situations where there is no other traditional property
available for division, 10 0 while others merely require the wife to have
had a reasonable expectation that she would be rewarded for her
contributions. 10
While these equitable solutions are understandably popular in
the situation where the newly divorced wife gets neither a substantial
94. Greene, Dissolution of the "Educational Partnership" Marriage, 55 FLA. B.J. 292,
296-97 (1981).
95. Moore, supra note 8, at 550.
96. Id. at 554.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), affid, 9 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982); Moore, supra note 8. See supra text accompanying notes 59-98.
100. See, e.g., Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 9 FAM.L.
REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982).
101. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1979).
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property distribution nor alimony, it is not the function of the courts
to disregard well established legal theory in order to satisfy their
own sense of fairness. The idea of finding property interests only in
the absence of traditional marital assets requires a case-by-case
analysis, inevitably resulting in doctrinal confusion and inequity to
the parties. °2

II.

REFUSING TO TREAT THE DEGREE AS MARITAL PROPERTY

The majority of courts addressing the issue of whether a professional degree should be considered a marital asset have answered the
question in the negative. The general view is that a degree is not
property and that a wife who contributes to the attainment of her
husband's professional degree may not, upon divorce, be awarded a
share of it as part of property distribution. 10 3 The case of Lesman v.
Lesman10 4 presented this question as one of first impression to the
appellate courts of New York State. The majority held that a
spouse's professional degree and/or future earnings are not, under
0 5
any circumstances, divisible marital property.1
In Lesman, the parties were married after the husband graduated from college. Two days after their marriage, the couple moved
to Mexico where the husband attended medical school. The wife did
not work during their 3 years there. The husband's education was
paid for by various educational and personal loans as well as by the
husband's savings. At one point between 1972 and 1973, the wife
returned to New York for approximately five months and worked,
earning $25 per week. The court found no evidence that she gave
any of this money to her husband. 0 8 When the couple returned to
New York after the husband had received his degree, he worked in a
non-salaried position for one year. During this year and for the fol102. See infra text accompanying notes 119-26.
103. E.g., Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (1982).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 158-60, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939-40. Accord Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488,
453 A.2d 527 (1982).
106. 88 A.D.2d at 154, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37. This finding should have resulted in the
end of the court's inquiry. The typical case which raises the issue of a professional degree as

distributable marital property involves the wife sacrificing her schooling or standard of living
in order to finance her husband's education. These courts have been faced with the task of
achieving an equitable result for the contributing wife when the couple divorces. In the Les-

man case, however, since the wife did not make any monetary contributions to her husband's
medical education, there was no basis for her to claim the degree as marital property. It was

unnecessary, therefore, for the court even to analyze the issue.
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lowing six months, the wife worked and earned $115 per week. 117
The Lesman court declined to value the husband's professional
degree and refused to consider it as marital property subject to equitable distribution. 0 8 The court reasoned that even the most extensive
reading of the concept of property does not encompass an educational degree. 09 The court stated that a degree
"does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable
value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates
on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned,
sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a
cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere
expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that
may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our
view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of
that term."' 10
The Lesman court also reasoned that to consider a professional
degree a marital asset subject to equitable distribution would necessitate treating the potential earning power that may result from that
degree as property. The court stated that "[e]nhanced earning capacity is not property. It is not vested, it is only an uncertain expectancy, for it is dependent upon the future success and efforts of the
degree holder.""' Additionally, the calculation of future earnings
107. Id.
108. Id. at 155, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (quoting Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432,
574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978)). See also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982),
where the court described a professional degree as a personal achievement of the holder which
cannot be sold nor accurately valued. The Graham court noted that in drafting the equitable
distribution statute, the Colorado legislature intended that the concept of property be broadly
inclusive. The court stated, however, that there were necessary limits to what may be considered property and that "[w]e do not find any indication in the Act that the concept as used by
the legislature is other than that usually understood to be embodied within the term." 194
Colo. at 431-32, 574 P.2d at 76-77. The court then cited the following definition of property:
"[E]verything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate." Id.
at 432, 574 P.2d at 77 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
The dissent argued, however, that the court in Graham did not follow the legislature's
broad concept of property when it evaluated the professional degree. See Graham, 194 Colo. at
434, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
111. 88 A.D.2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938. This fact was also recognized by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982), which
maintained that "a [person's] 'earning capacity, even where its development has been aided
and enhanced by the other spouse, . . . should not be recognized as a separate particular item
of property.'" Id. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532 (quoting Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257
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can be valid only if the husband actually utilizes the degree for its
intended purpose. Awarding the wife a portion of future income
symbolically locks the husband into a specific career and denies him
the choice to abandon the profession in which he earned his
degree.""
The Lesman court also considered the problem of calculation
that is inherent in any attempt to value such a speculative asset. The

court opined that
[i]t is almost impossible to predict what amount of enhanced earnings, if any, will result from a professional education. The degree
of financial success attained by those holding a professional degree
varies greatly. Some, even, may earn less from their professional
practices than they could have earned from non-professional
work. 113

Other courts have also recognized the potential for inequity to
the spouse who never practices his profession. In DeWitt v. DeWitt, 14 the court stated that a spouse "will have been awarded a

share of something which never existed in any real sense." 111 The
court continued:
An award based upon the prediction of the degree holder's success
at the chosen field may bear no relationship to the reality he or she
faces after the divorce. Unlike an award of alimony, which can be
adjusted after divorce to reflect unanticipated changes in the parties' circumstances, a property division may not.'

Thus, gross inequities may result from awarding the wife the potential value of the degree, since such a property settlement, unlike alimony,117 may not be modified to meet future realities.118
(1975)).
112. Greene, supra note 94, at 296-97. See also Moore, supra note 8,at 549-50.
113. 88 A.D.2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938. Accord Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J.
488, 496, 453 A.2d 527, 531 (1982), (the court stated it "has never subjected to equitable
distribution an asset whose future monetary value is as uncertain and unquantiflable as a professional degree or license."). Mahoney recognized that many unforeseen events remain that
could affect a person's earning potential and that one practicing a profession "'may fail at it,
or may practice in a specialty, location or manner which generates less than the average income enjoyed by fellow professionals.'" Id. at 498, 453 A.2d at 532 (quoting DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 52, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Ct. App. 1980)).
114. 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
115. Id. at 52, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
116. Id.
117. Alimony, traditionally, has been regarded as an extension of the husband's common
law duty of support. The purpose of alimony is to ensure that the standard of living to which
one spouse is entitled becomes the obligation of the other. Alimony is tailored to individual
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A fourth reason expounded by the Lesman court, in support of
its holding, was a desire to avoid "doctrinal chaos" which would result from characterizing an educational degree as property under
some circumstances and not under others."19 The court explained
that the termination of a marriage before the wife's expectations of
financial benefits are realized-because the couple has not yet accumulated a substantial marital estate--is a relatively common situation.

20

Under these circumstances, some courts hold the degree to

be marital property so as to restore to the wife the amount she has
contributed.12' However, if the marriage endures beyond the time
the husband graduates and his increased earning potential becomes a
reality, the wife's original expectations are thereby realized: "[A]s
the result of the husband's enhanced earnings, the parties will have
accumulated [at the time of divorce] marital property in which the
divorced wife will share and thereby receive a return on her investment.112 2 In this situation, courts following Inman v. Inman'23 and
Mahoney v. Mahoney 24 would hold that the degree is not property. 25 The Lesman court, however, refused to follow the reasoning
that the professional degree is property in some situations but not
others, stating that "'[i]f a license or degree or its enhanced earning
potential is not property five or ten or twenty years after graduation,
circumstances, particularly relating to the financial status of the parties. If there is a change in
actual need or ability to pay, the court will make adjustments as it sees fit, reasonable and just.
See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONs 420-22 (1968).

An alternative approach utilized by some courts is rehabilitative alimony. Unlike traditional alimony which is expected to continue until the wife remarries or dies, the rehabilitative
alimony award is intended to last only until the wife adjusts to her new circumstances and
becomes self-supporting. For example, in Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 (1980), the
court approved the concept of rehabilitative alimony where a short-term or lump-sum award
would enable the former spouse to complete the preparation necessary for economic self-sufficiency. See also Hill v. Hill, 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537 (1982).
118, 88 A.D.2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
119. Id. at 158, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 157-58, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
122. Id. at 158, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
123. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 9 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982).
124. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
125. The Inman court stated that in a marriage where there are sizable traditional marital assets, the wife would receive a substantial property award and therefore the professional
license would not have to be evaluated as property. 578 S.W.2d at 268. The Mahoney court
stated "where the parties to a divorce have accumulated substantial assets during a lengthy
marriage, courts should compensate for any unfairness to one party who sacrificed for the
other's education, not by reimbursement alimony but by an equitable distribution of the assets. . .

."

91 N.J. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535, 536.
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it cannot be property on graduation day either.' "126
While the Lesman court was sympathetic to the situation where
the wife sacrifices and supports her husband only to be deserted
shortly after he attains his educational degree, it nonetheless refused
to fashion an equitable remedy of restitution to repay the wife for
the contributions she had made, reasoning that marriage is more
than an economic endeavor. 127 The parties follow a self-determined
and mutual plan to
provide financial support and non-financial services to each other,
and they do not place values on their respective contributions, nor
do they expect to pay each other for those contributions. Every
unsuccessful marriage results in the disappointment of expectations, financial as well as non-financial,
but it does not result in a
128
financial loss in a commercial sense.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in DeWitt v. DeWitt 29 elaborated on this notion when it rejected the claim of special recompense
for financing a spouse's education.130 Dewitt specifically rejected this
approach since the court believed that equity is not served by placing
a monetary value on the intangible degree. 13 ' The court stated that
to do so "treats the parties as though they were strictly business
partners, one of whom has made a calculated investment in the commodity of the other's professional training, expecting a dollar for dollar return. We do not think that most marital planning is so coldly
undertaken.' ' 2
Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Wisner v. Wisner'33
rejected an equitable remedy based upon a theory of unjust enrichment. The court refused to treat a marriage, absent any specific
agreement, "as an arm's length transaction by allowing a spouse to
come into court after the fact and make legal arguments regarding
unjust enrichment by reason of the other spouse receiving further
126.

88 A.D.2d at 158, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (quoting Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J.

Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062, rev'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527).

127.

88 A.D.2d at 159, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.

128.
129.
130.

Id.
98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
Id.

131.

Id.; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 500, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (1982)

(marriage is not like a commercial situation in which the husband and wife record their

financial obligations and contributions for the purpose of settlement upon divorce).
132.
133.

98 Wis. 2d at 50, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981).
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education during coverture." 3 4 The court reasoned that the spouses
decide what each one will contribute to the marriage and that the
choice to support the husband's pursuit of a professional degree is
"mutual, consensual and made with full understanding of the sacrifices that necessarily accompanied the decision."" 5 The Wisner court
concluded, therefore, that there was no basis for a claim of unjust
enrichment upon divorce.136
Thus, the courts that refuse to treat a professional degree as
marital property subject to distribution upon divorce reason that although the failure of the marriage may mean disappointment of future financial and nonfinancial expectations, divorce does not represent a commercial investment loss. Since the terminated
expectations cannot be recompensed by a monetary claim, these
courts have concluded that there is no basis on which to value each
spouse's contributions to the marriage. This compensation, therefore, will not be made by valuing the professional degree as a marital
asset.
III.

WHY THE PROFESSIONAL DEGREE SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED MARITAL PROPERTY

Courts that have concluded that the professional degree is not
marital property subject to distribution upon divorce have done so
based upon sound reasoning. First, an educational degree does not
constitute property in any traditional sense.137 It is only by stretching
the concept of property beyond well established principles that a degree can be regarded as property because it lacks the common and
inherent traits of property such as exchange or transferable value,
assignability or inheritability.13s
It has been argued that an educational degree is no different
than other intangible items of property in which proprietary status
has been found. Several courts, including the United States Supreme
Court in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,139 have found that non-vested
pension benefits are distributable in a property division upon
marriage dissolution.1 40 Similarly, the Uniform Services' Former
134. Id. at 341, 631 P.2d at 123 (emphasis in original).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
138. For a list of the courts holding that an educational degree is not property, see cases
cited supra note 5.
139. 439 U.S. 572 (1977).
140. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 154 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr.
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Spouse's Protection Act14 1 makes federal military retirement pay
subject to state divorce laws. 4 2 An educational degree is distinguishable, however, from these other intangible assets, thus making its
classification as property inappropriate.1 4 3 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey in Mahoney v. Mahoney14 4 recognized this difference.
After noting that it had previously held military retirement pay and
disability benefits to be distributable marital property, 145 the court
stated:
[This court] has never subjected to equitable distribution an asset
whose future monetary value is as uncertain and unquantifiable as
a professional degree or license ...
A professional . . . degree represents the opportunity to
obtain an amount of money only upon the occurrence of highly uncertain future events. By contrast, the vested but unmatured pension . . . entitle[s] 1the
owner to a definite amount of money at a
46
certain future date.
A second reason for refusing to hold a degree as a distributable
asset is that its value lies in the enhanced earning potential of the
acquiring spouse. If the degree is treated as property, this results in
treating the earning capacity as property as well. Several courts have
correctly noted that future earning power is not property since it is
not vested and is of uncertain amount due to innumerable factors
contributing to the success of its bearer.1 47 This was well illustrated
in Mahoney where the court declined to hold the potential for increased future earnings, made possible by the professional degree, to
be property subject to distribution. The Mahoney court concluded
that the husband's earning capacity should not be recognized as a
separate item of property within the meaning of the equitable distribution statute.1 48 The court stated that finding earning capacity to
633 (1976). Cf. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 346, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (professional goodwill is

property subject to division upon marital dissolution). But see Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J.
488, 497 n.3, 453 A.2d 527, 532 n.3 (1982) ("[a] professional degree should not be equated
with goodwill which, .... may, in a given case, add economic worth to a property interest").
141. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-08 (1982).
142. Id. § 1408 (c)(i).
143. See supra note 40; see also supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
144. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).

145.

Id. at 495, 453 A.2d at 531 (citing Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 468, 375 A.2d

659, 661 (1977)).

146.
147.

Id. at 496, 453 A.2d at 531.
See, e.g., Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); Aufmuth

v. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
148. 91 N.J. at 496, 453 A.2d at 531.
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be property would result in distribution of "income that the degree
holder might never acquire. The amount of future earnings would be
entirely speculative. Moreover, any assets resulting from income for
professional services would be property acquired after the marriage;
the statute restricts equitable distribution to property acquired dur14
ing the marriage." 9
A similar result was reached in Aufmuth v. Aufmuth15 0 where,
under California's community property system, the court found that
a community interest exists in property acquired during the marriage but not in post-marital earnings.1 51 The court stated that to
hold the income potential of the degree as an asset for purposes of
community property would require awarding a share of the postmarital earnings. 52 These post-dissolution earnings, however, "are
by definition the separate property of the acquiring spouse."'1 3 The
court reasoned that since community interest can only be acquired
during the marriage,15 4 it would be inconsistent with the purpose of
that system to include the results of post-marital efforts in the distributable marital estate.155
A third reason why a professional degree should not be considered marital property is that the actual value of the degree is not as
easily assesable as tangible property such as a car or a piece of realty. Since the degree has none of the traditional attributes of property that can be valued,156 any computation would inherently be pure
speculation. As noted by the court in DeWitt v. DeWitt, 57 many factors render it virtually impossible to make an accurate measurement
of the degree's worth.158 For example, there is no guarantee that the
professional spouse would actually practice in the field in which he
earned his degree, or that his earnings would equal what the court
projected as anticipated income.
It is argued that the speculation rationale, used by courts when
they refuse to evaluate an educational degree, is meritless.1 59 For ex149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

155.
156,
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532 (emphasis in original).
89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
Id. at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
Id.
Id.
See CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 5107, 5108, 5110 (West. Supp. 1982).
89 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
See supra text accompanying note 109-10.
98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980).
See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 8, at 547.
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ample, it is contended that valuation of the professional degree for
matrimonial actions involves no more speculation than determining
the value of an education in terms of its economic potential in both
wrongful death actions and personal injury cases.'6 0 Important policy
differences, however, separate the law of torts from the law of marital property division, thereby precluding application of this rationale
to the latter type of action. First, in a tort case, an award based on
future earnings is given to the victim for the purpose of compensating what has been wrongfully taken away."6 ' In contrast, the purpose
of marital property distribution is to divide equitably between the
spouses all property accrued during the marriage. 6 2 Calculating a
degree's potential worth in a matrimonial action should not be done
for compensation purposes, since the spouse is not a victim. Providing a spouse something she has been wrongfully deprived of is not
the purpose of property distribution. 6 3 Second, and equally important, awarding projected earnings is the only measurement available
to compensate a tort victim. It is the most certain method of giving
him what he would have earned had he not been injured. In contrast,
a marital estate, however small, can be divided with specificity. This
avoids unduly prejudicing the professional husband who may earn
less than anticipated. Furthermore, potential earning capacity can be
considered by the trial judge in determining the issue of alimony.'"
Thus, future earnings is an uncertain and unnecessary factor in dividing the marital estate.
A fourth reason for not including a professional degree as marital property subject to division is that limiting valuation of the degree only to situations where there are no other assets will result in
tremendous inequities and inconsistencies among the cases. By following these guidelines, some wives who supported their husbands
through school will receive a share of the degree and others will not,
the outcome being determined by the number of years the couple has
had to acquire tangible property assets, and the caprice of trial
judges. If a degree cannot be classified as property upon dissolution
160. See id.; supra note 47.
161.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 905-06 (4th ed. 1971).

162. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 496, 453 A.2d 527, 531 (1982).
163. Additionally, in tort cases the defendant has intentionally or negligently injured or
interfered with the rights of the victim. This situation does not arise in a matrimonial action,
especially since many jurisdictions, in deciding property division and alimony, no longer consider the fault of the divorcing spouses. See generally Note, supra note 12, at 71 n.44.
164. See infra notes 172-73; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 504-05, 503
A.2d 527, 535 (1982).
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when the holder has practiced his profession for ten years and accumulated substantial assets, then the same degree cannot be property
when dissolution occurs shortly after graduation. Concluding otherwise defies logic and is contrary to the principles of legal precedent.
This problem is further underscored when one considers the vast
number of cases that will fall between the two extremes of no traditional marital assets and sizeable marital estates. Courts are, in all
probability, incapable of drawing an equitable cut-off line. For example, courts would need to set a minimum value for marital estates
which would, upon division, equitably compensate wives who
financed their husband's educations. The degree would be considered
property only when the value of the couple's assets did not reach the
minimum figure. There are, however, several problems with this
formula. First, it is not appropriate for the court to speculate on
what amount would represent a minimally sufficient marital estate.
Second, and more importantly, each couple's lifestyle and expectations are different, as is the earning capacity of each degree holder.
If the cut-off line was set, for example, at $20,000, one couple married for three years after the attainment of the degree may have
saved twice that, while a similar couple may have anticipated accumulating that amount only after ten years. Thus, it will be nearly
impossible to set a standard of how much marital property is enough
before the wife is "fully compensated" and the professional license
can therefore be excluded from property distribution.
This situation has already arisen in Kentucky where the court in
Leveck v. Leveck 65 refused to follow its own precedent of Inman v.
Inman, 68 holding instead that it was unnecessary to treat the husband's medical degree as marital property. The court stated that although the wife supported the couple and paid for the husband's education, she is entitled to maintenance and an equitable result could
7
be reached on that basis.'6
Finally, even if the marriage terminates before the expected
"fruits" of the education are borne, the wife's financial contributions
to the husband's education during marriage should not be evaluated
165. 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
166. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 1982).

167. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d at 712. The court specifically distinguished Inman on the basis
that in Leveck, the wife had not worked for the seven and one-half years preceding the divorce,
and that there was a small marital estate, while in Inman, the only article of value was the
husband's degree. Id.
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and calculated by the court for the purpose of commercially recompensing the contributions. 168 The principles of restitution, implied
loan, unjust enrichment, and quasi-contract should not apply to a
marriage. All of these reimbursement approaches treat the couple as
business partners, with the investing wife anticipating a monetary
return. It would be contrary to public policy to consider marital
planning as such a cold endeavor. As the court in Mahoney v. Mahoney 6 9 noted, "[m]arriage is not a business arrangement in which the
parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled
upon divorce."170
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, a professional degree should not
be considered marital property. Neither the money spent in obtaining the degree nor the future earnings enhanced by it accurately
represent the degree's value. This approach fails to consider the nonfinancial efforts of the spouse trying to earn the degree. The relative
values of the spouses' individual contributions during the marriage
cannot and should not be retrospectively assessed and weighed
against each other. Thus, the wife is not entitled to reimbursement
for the financial contributions through property distribution statutes.
Rather, this compensation should be left to the alimony and maintenance provisions. It is a matter for the legislature, not the courts, to
provide that "property" includes an educational degree or the enhanced future earnings it may provide.' 71 Courts are empowered to
achieve equity by granting maintenance to a wife or by awarding her
a large portion of the marital estate.17 2 When calculating maintenance, the court can consider the contributions made by the wife to
the husband's career and the potential earning capacity of the husband.173 Thus, if the education allows for greater earning, the equity
to the receiving spouse will be reflected in the alimony payments that
will be made on the basis of the payer's income. If these compensation devices still result in inequity to some spouses, then it is the
legislature's role to provide a remedy. 74 However, until the legisla168. See supra text accompanying notes 127-36.
169. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
170. Id. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533.
171. See Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
172. See id.; supra note 117.
173. E.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
174. For example, the Indiana legislature allows the courts to provide restitution to the
contributing spouse when there are few marital assets. However, this reimbursement is limited
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ture directs the courts to do so, a degree should not be valued as a
marital asset subject to distribution upon divorce.
Ann E. Weiss

to direct outlays for the degree, such as tuition and books, and does not extend to future
earnings made possible by the degree. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (West Supp. 198283).
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